It is often said that opinion columns are long on opinion but short on fact. Brian Lee Crawley has confirmed this in his recent opinion column on the prospects of commuter rail in HRM (Don't be railroaded on issue of urban transit, 20 December 2000).
Since the HRM commuter rail committee is no longer considering light-rail as an option, it makes little sense to discuss Mr. Crawley's ignorance of light-rail. However, some of Mr. Crawley's other opinions cannot be left unchallenged.
For example, Mr. Crawley is of the opinion that taxes paid by road users pay for all the costs of the roads. Not only is this claim incorrect, it is also misleading. It is incorrect because provincial fuel taxes collected in HRM are kept by the province and not shared with the city, meaning that road costs in HRM are paid for through municipal taxes. It is misleading because fuel taxes do not cover a variety of road-related costs, including the cost of policing our roads, the cost of accidents (paid for by our over-stretched hospital system), and environmental costs (such as the compensation paid for by the province to home owners whose wells have been contaminated by road salt).
Mr. Crawley appears to advocate dedicated bus lanes as an alternative to rail. In some urban centres, bus lanes are a viable option; however, there is little room left for road expansion on the Halifax peninsula, let alone for dedicated bus lanes. The last version of the "GoPlan" was rejected by the vociferous opposition of many residents who did not want their streets widened to accomodate more automobiles. It is questionable whether residents would welcome bus lanes, given that 'dedicated' bus lanes in many cities gradually revert back to the automobile.
One of Mr. Crawley's more interesting opinions is that the automobile makes a major contribution to solving the "urban transit problem" (implying that our traffic problems are caused by urban transit rather than the automobile). Despite years of funding cuts and reduction in service, Metro Transit still carries about 30,000 riders a day. If it weren't for urban transit systems like Metro Transit, our roads would be clogged with even more automobiles. (Anyone wanting to experience Mr. Crawley's "urban transit problem" should try waiting for a bus in Bayer's Lake Industrial Park on a weekday or Saturday afternoon.)
Mr. Crawley also proposes road pricing as means to limit automobile access on major arteries and to pay for road maintenance (road pricing requires drivers to pay a toll for entering, for example, the Halifax peninsula). Road pricing is used in a limited number of cities, including Singapore and Oslo; access charges can be quite high, $3 in the case of Singapore (Halifax already has a form of road pricing on the two bridges -- the toll helps pay for the maintenance of the bridges). Rather than having toll booths, Mr. Crawley's plan would use transponders in each car (much like the MacPass).
Singapore originally required road users to purchase daily licences to allow access to the central business district; the inconvenience of having to purchase licences on a daily basis made a significant reduction in traffic. However, when Singapore adopted a transponder system, the deterrent effect was reduce, and traffic volumes increased. It is worth noting that one of the faults found with road pricing is that it can have a major impact on the working poor who are forced to drive.
One of Mr. Crawley's strongest arguments against urban transit is that a person can work at Purdy's Wharf and drive to meetings in Dartmouth or have lunch at Saint Mary's. True as this is, it overlooks the fact that the same person could ride a bus to work and take a taxi to any destination in the city -- eliminating the stress of driving and the problem of finding parking spaces.
We are about to experience a number of profound changes over the next decade: our population is ageing and fuel prices are rising. Much of what we take for granted now could be unsustainable in the future. The transition to this future will be much smoother if we develop and implement transportation and urban growth plans that reduce our reliance on the automobile.
Published: January 2001 (Chronicle-Herald)
As many readers are aware, the government of Nova Scotia recently completed public consultations for a new provincial energy strategy. Not surprisingly, the strategy focussed on oil and natural gas, since the government sees the extraction and sale of fossil fuels as the salvation to most of the province's economic woes.
The obvious bias towards oil and natural gas went so far as to downplay the present use and potential benefits of renewable energy. For example, graphs in the document associated with the consultations showed that the only sources of 'primary' energy used by the province were oil (66%), coal (33%), and hydro-electricity (1%). The fact that wood-waste and biomass account for about 8.5% of provincial primary energy demand was omitted. Similarly, the consultation document did little more than mention sources of renewable energy (such as wind, solar, and biomass) in passing.
A criticism made by several renewable energy proponents was the lack of any clear plan to reduce the province's reliance on fossil fuels for the generation of electricity. A number of "green power" modifications to the energy strategy were proposed; three of the more notable were:
A provincial energy strategy built around a strong green power component would not only reduce the province's reliance on fossil fuels, it would help improve air quality, reduce carbon emissions, and encourage the growth of local renewable energy industries. However, to achieve this would require foresight on the part of the provincial government.
Less than two weeks after the provincial government's "Energy Forum" held at Saint Mary's University in mid-June (that continued to promote the government's oil and natural gas agenda), Nova Scotia Power announced its intention to purchase "up to 50 megawatts of wind generated electricity" from independent power producers.
Whether it was by accident or design, Nova Scotia Power's announcement will benefit Nova Scotia Power and the provincial government. How it will benefit Nova Scotians and potential IPPs is still open to debate.
Nova Scotia Power has been under growing pressure from the public and its shareholders to do something "green". Their decision to purchase two 600 kilowatt wind turbines and erect them before the end of the year has little to do with green power production but everything to do with public relations (siting decisions have been based upon how visible the turbines are, not the quality of the wind resource). Similarly, their intention to purchase up to 50 megawatts of wind generated electricity is more an exercise in public relations than it is to help the environment. Consider their reasons (given in their Press Release of 25 June 2001):
The provincial government, unwilling to budge from its fossil-based energy strategy, can now use Nova Scotia Power as an example of the province's dedication to sustainable energy and green power. Nothing could be further from the truth. Fifty megawatts of wind represents about two percent of Nova Scotia Power's total generating capacity. The total amount of electricity that can be obtained from 50 megawatts of wind turbines is small, about 1.2 percent of the electricity generated by Nova Scotia Power in 2000 (less than the amount of electricity imported by Nova Scotia Power from New Brunswick in 2000). Nitrogen oxides, sulphur dioxide, mercury, and carbon dioxide emissions will decline only if electricity from fossil fuel generation is replaced by electricity from wind generation.
The provincial government's refusal to adopt a green component in its energy strategy will leave control of the electrical energy market in the hands of Nova Scotia Power, which will determine:
If past history is anything to go by, there is no reason to believe that all 50 megawatts will be purchased by Nova Scotia Power. Just prior to its privitization, Nova Scotia Power was required to purchase 50 megawatts of power from IPPs. To date, Nova Scotia Power has accepted no more than 25 megawatts.
Nova Scotia's energy strategy should outline how the province intends to manage both its non-renewable and renewable energy resources. Our non-renewable energy is being sold off with no regard to the future. Our renewable energy is being left in the hands of a single utility.
This is not the strategy to ensure Nova Scotia's economic, environmental, and energy future.
Published: Daily News (6 July 2001)
The other day, a friend dropped by my office to recount a strange and terrifying nightmare that occurred after reading an editorial in the 27 July edition of the Chronicle-Herald, entitled "Highway services". My friend waved a copy of the editorial at me and asked me to read it.
The editorial seemed innocent enough. It discussed what to do now that Ottawa and the province had decided to pour limited resources into the twinning of Highway 101. In addition to better road signage, the editorial called for more service stops such as those found along the Massachusetts Turnpike operated by McDonalds, in partnership with Exxon, Legal Seafoods, and Ben and Jerry's Ice Cream.
Before I had a chance to ask, my friend began to recount the nightmare.
We were driving down the newly twinned Highway 101. In the distance, the sky was lit-up by a flashing neon sign, announcing the presence of one of the 'plazas' described in the editorial.
We pulled into a space in a huge parking lot. Something didn't seem right, all the cars were gas-guzzling behemoths with huge tail fins. Before we could get out of the car, a young woman on roller skates, chewing bubble gum, skated over and asked what we wanted. The menu seemed to be restricted to root beer, milk shakes, hamburgers, and french fries. Looking around we saw dozens of young people: the boys with greased back hair, white tee-shirts, black trousers, and boots with pointed toes; the girls with poodle skirts, bobby socks, and saddle shoes.
The conversation was hard to understand, since most of it was punctuated by words such as "daddy-o", "hip", and "cool-cat". The music of Buddy Holly filled the air.
Suddenly, my friend stopped and asked, "Do you realize what this means?"
"Yes", I replied, "The Chronicle-Herald wants to lead Nova Scotia kicking and screaming into the 1950s."
Submitted to Chronicle-Herald (2 August 2001): Unpublished
Given his government's love affair with highways and the internal combustion engine, it was surprising to read about Premier Hamm's concerns regarding Canada's lack of a national transportation policy and the importance of rail (Hamm to discuss transportation woes, 2 August). If Premier Hamm has finally recognized the importance of rail (including safety, environmental benefits, and economic potential) then his government should institute a provincial transportation policy. At a minimum, the policy should:
Submitted to Chronicle-Herald (8 August 2001): Published
Last May, NS Power announced plans to erect two 600-kilowatt wind turbines by October 2001. The purpose behind these plans was threefold:
The site selected was Cheticamp Island, off the west coast of Cape Breton. The reason given for selecting this site was its "legendary southeast winds". As most readers of this newspaper are now aware, NS Power has been forced to abandon its construction plans because of opposition by area residents. Opponents cited concerns over the visual impact of the turbines and their effects on colonies of great blue herons.
NS Power's actions have been a textbook example of how not to deal with wind energy projects. First, and probably foremost, no company serious about wind energy would site a wind turbine in a location simply because it has "legendary winds". Everywhere in Nova Scotia is windy, or so the residents will tell you. The question is, what is the strength, duration, and seasonal variability of the wind? This is an important question to answer, since this information will dictate how much power can be generated and when it can be generated. Consequently, utility-sized turbines (such as those intended for Cheticamp Island) are sited in areas where the wind regime has been measured for at least one year (to determine the strength, duration, and variability). In fact, banks won't lend money to companies wanting to install turbines without sufficient wind data.
Second, despite the belief that there is widespread public support for 'green power' (that is, electricity generated from renewable sources, such as solar, biomass, and wind), not everyone is willing to have a wind turbine "in their backyard". Successful turbine installations require the power producer to work with local organizations and community groups. In many cases, it can take months of negotiations to settle upon an agreeable site. Even then, there can still be opposition: to some people, wind turbines are a thing of beauty; while to others they are a blight on the landscape.
Strange as it may seem, this is not the first time NS Power has had difficulties dealing with wind energy. Many years ago, the provincially owned Nova Scotia Power invested in a wind turbine that was installed in Wreck Cove, Cape Breton. The turbine failed and, according to many people, the failure was used as an excuse by Nova Scotia Power to ignore wind power for at least 20 years.
Prior to the Cheticamp Island fiasco, NS Power announced its intention to purchase "up to 50 megawatts of wind generated electricity" from one or more independent power producers. Apparently, NS Power has received proposals from twenty or so interested parties.
Studies have shown that the province has enormous wind energy potential, well in excess of the 50 megawatts being called for by NS Power. Restricting the province to 50 megawatts of electricity from the wind makes little sense, economically or environmentally. Yet it will be NS Power, with its obvious lack of understanding of the fundamentals of wind energy, that will determine the fate of commercial wind energy production in Nova Scotia.
The vast majority of Nova Scotia's electrical energy production comes from coal, with some oil, and, on occasion, natural gas. It is folly to rely so heavily on these fuels, since their supply is falling as world demand is increasing. Nova Scotia's provincial government proposed energy policy focuses on off-shore oil and natural gas, ignoring the potential of renewable energy.
Sooner or later, Nova Scotia will follow the lead of developed countries such as Denmark and Germany, obtaining significant amounts of electrical energy from the wind. It would seem that NS Power's incompetence and the provincial government's shortsightedness will ensure that it will be later, rather than sooner.
Published: Daily News (29/8/01)
In her letter defending Nova Scotia Power's failed attempt at installing two wind turbines on Cheticamp Island (Wind Power Good For Environment, 16 September), Joan McDougall would have us believe that her employer, Nova Scotia Power, is resolute in its support for wind power. Like most Nova Scotians, I want to believe Ms. McDougall; however, if past actions are anything to go by, it would appear that wind power is simply another attempt to make Nova Scotia Power appear 'green'.
For example, in her letter, Ms. McDougall has neatly shifted the focus from the failure to install these two turbines to the amount of power that could be obtained from "up to 50 megawatts" of wind power from companies bidding to supply wind energy to Nova Scotia Power. Disregarding the fact that these turbines don't exist, we are told that if they did, they would displace 116,000 tonnes of carbon dioxide, 1,688 tonnes of sulphur dioxide and 328 tonnes of nitrous oxides annually.
Meanwhile, at the Tuft's Cove generating station in Dartmouth, recently converted to burn either heavy oil or natural gas, Nova Scotia Power continues to burn 'dirty' heavy oil while selling natural gas to New England. If Nova Scotia Power was to burn natural gas rather than the heavy oil in Tuft's Cove, carbon dioxide emissions could drop by about 900,000 tonnes annually and local air quality would improve dramatically.
For years, Nova Scotia Power's Wreck Cove wind turbine was used by Nova Scotia Power as an example of why wind power was not feasible. However, now that Nova Scotia Power is suddenly promoting wind power, Ms. McDougall glosses over the company's past record, telling us that the engineers who worked on the Wreck Cove turbine were "visionary and groundbreaking". The engineers may well have been visionary, but this has conveniently overlooked the fact that Nova Scotia Power has shown no real interest in wind energy until recently, and as a result, lags well behind American, European, and other Canadian utilities.
We are also told that despite the Cheticamp Island failure, Nova Scotia Power's resolve to adopt wind energy is "reinforced" because other communities have offered to host the wind turbines. This expedient resolve shouldn't be surprising, since Nova Scotia Power has committed significant amounts of money to purchasing these turbines and all they are doing is sitting in warehouses.
Nova Scotia Power's call for "up to 50 megawatts" of installed wind generating capacity has been described as a "significant starting point" by Ms. McDougall. It is debatable how significant this really is. First, Nova Scotia Power has not committed itself to 50 megawatts, it has stated that it will take "up to" 50 megawatts (when Nova Scotia Power was privatized, it was required to purchase 50 megawatts of renewable energy from independent power producers; it has taken about half this amount).
Second, The total amount of electricity that can be obtained from "up to 50 megawatts" of wind turbines is small, about 1.2 percent of the electricity generated by Nova Scotia Power in 2000 (less than the amount of electricity imported by Nova Scotia Power from New Brunswick in 2000). Third, it is Nova Scotia Power, a company with a less than stellar environmental record, that will determine the percentage of electricity generated from renewable sources to be incorporated into the province's energy mix.
As people become more environmentally aware, the need to appear 'green' is assuming a critical role in the public image of many corporations and governments. Companies such as Ford, BP, and Royal Dutch Shell all practice greenwashing; that is, presenting a green public image to gloss over their less-than-environmentally friendly core corporate business. Low-cost, high-visibility environmental projects are often used to deflect attention from activities that the public might find objectionable.
Some people might say that Nova Scotia Power's sudden interest in wind power is another example of corporate greenwash. Maybe it isn't -- maybe Nova Scotia Power has changed. However, until Nova Scotia Power makes a serious, long-term commitment to obtaining electricity from new sources that are sustainable and renewable (such as wind), any 'green' claims by Nova Scotia Power will have to be examined very carefully.
Submitted to Daily News (28 September 2001): Published
Sarah Levy claims that the 800,000 food rations dropped by the U.S. military is an example of compassion towards the Afghanistan people (letter, 2 November 2001). This is a most peculiar form of compassion.
800,000 food rations appears to be a very large number, until you realize that, according to a report in the Globe and Mail, a food ration weighs about 350 grams. This means that the U.S. military has dropped less than 300 tonnes of food aid on Afghanistan.
These airdropped food rations are not targeted, they can fall anywhere, and they do. A week ago, BBC World showed soldiers of the Northern Alliance eating these rations. Other people were shown, hoarding whatever rations they could find.
As part of the 'war' on terrorism, the U.S. military are dropping cluster bombs on Afghanistan. When a cluster bomb hits the ground, it scatters 'bomblets' in a wide area. About five percent of these 'bomblets' fail to explode and can remain active for years. The bomblets are yellow. The food rations are enclosed in yellow plastic wrappers. Hungry people can be confused -- with devastating results. In light of this, the U.S. military has announced that they will change colour of the food wrappers.
The U.S. bombing is destroying what is left of the infrastructure of Afghanastan. Roads and bridges that are vital to the distribution of food supplies have been hit. Red Cross buildings have been destroyed.
It is estimated that six million Afghans face starvation this winter. The UN World Food Programme has stated that 52,000 tonnes of food aid is required per month to fend off starvation. The U.S. bombing has delayed the distribution of food, intensifying the humanitarian crisis.
If the U.S. and its military want to defeat terrorism and the Taliban, they could start by halting the bombing and allowing humanitarian assistance reach those who need it. Airdrops make good photo-ops but they don't help those who are in need.
Submitted to Chronicle-Herald (5 November 2001): Unpublished
As most commuters to the Halifax peninsula are well aware, an increase in traffic inevitably leads to congestion. The solution to congestion adopted by many traffic engineering departments around the world is twofold: traffic calming and road widening. Traffic calming involves the installation of devices, such as traffic lights or speed bumps, to slow (or discourage) drivers from using a roadway. Road widening, usually more expensive than traffic calming, requires the acquisition of additional land. When these measures fail (as they invariably do) and more traffic is generated, the cycle is repeated, with more calming and more widening. Of course, this cycle cannot be repeated indefinitely, since there is a limit to how much traffic calming a road can take before it becomes impassable and road widths are limited to the amount of land available.
We are seeing examples of this throughout HRM. Clayton Park West's rapid growth, coupled with the influx of "big boxes" in Bayer's Lake Industrial Park, has resulted in increased volumes of traffic. The response has been the installation of a traditional traffic-calming measure: additional traffic lights (there are now nine sets of traffic lights between the Dunbrack-Lacewood intersection and the Susie Lake Crescent-Chain Lake Drive intersection). These traffic-calming measures have proven insufficient, requiring the addition of new turning lanes at the Highway 102 exit ramp.
Access to the Halifax peninsula illustrates the limits to road widening and traffic calming: the lack of land available for new roadways and the reaction of both commuters and residents to calming measures. There are very few roads left on the Halifax peninsula that can be widened; those that can are usually defended by the residents who live near them. The last Go Plan proposed widening Bayer's Road between Highway 102 and Connaught Avenue; when the residents heard of the proposal, they were outraged and the plans were soon shelved.
The congestion caused by the increased volume of traffic on roads such as Quinpool and Chebucto has resulted in some commuters taking "shortcuts" through residential neighbourhoods. Residents of these neighbourhoods are understandably annoyed when this occurs, which causes them to lobby to have traffic calming applied to their streets. If traffic calming measures are employed, the commuters who once used the short cut are annoyed, which causes them to lobby to have the traffic calming removed. The result is the situation we now see in the Armview area.
It is time we realized that the traditional methods of solving our traffic problems will no longer work if we intend to keep the Halifax peninsula a place where people can both live and work. The root of the problem is, as we all should realize by now, our dependence on the automobile.
The explosion of automobiles on our roads has several causes. Foremost amongst these is the creation of suburbs that are solely dependent upon the automobile. The location and layout of most suburbs do not lend themselves well to public transportation. Families who move to the suburbs typically require two cars: either for two working adults or for one working and one stay-at-home adult. Without some form of public transportation, young children must be chauffeured from place to place. When many of these young children reach the legal driving age, the first thing they want is an automobile of their own to give them the "freedom" to move from place to place. Some suburbs are reaching the point where there is one automobile for each member of the household.
If the traditional solutions will not work, it is debatable whether other technological "fixes" will work either. Building new roads to replace existing ones (such as replacing the Rotary with a "flyover") or turning Quinpool Road's four lanes into three-in-and-one-out in the morning and three-out-and-one-in in the evening, have two effects. First, they simply delay the inevitable: the traffic volumes will eventually return to and then exceed their previous values as more people commute by automobile. Second, "fixing" the problem in one place invariably creates a problem elsewhere.
The only realistic, long-term solution to Halifax peninsula's traffic problems is to reduce the number of automobiles on the road. The group ultimately responsible for implementing the solution will be HRM council. Council will have to make two critical decisions. First, to require the developers of new subdivisions to organize them in such a way that they are 'transit friendly', thereby allowing Metro Transit to operate its buses in an efficient and economic manner. Second, to fund Metro Transit so that it can maintain and then increase the percentage of the peninsula-bound commuters it currently carries (about thirty percent) to fifty percent or more. To achieve these goals it will be necessary to rethink the way public transportation is operated in HRM; for example, running a hierarchical, inter-modal system consisting of local buses feeding into limited-stop rapid-buses or commuter trains.
If solutions to Halifax peninsula's traffic problems are not found, it is likely that the problems will find their own solution. As people grow weary of ever increasing commute times, many will seek employment off the peninsula. Employers may be forced to follow suit, creating decentralized places of employment in, for example, Cole Harbour and Tantallon-Timberlea. This has happened in Bedford where a number of office buildings already exist. Should such a trend occur, downtown Halifax will become a less desirable place to do business, regardless of the number of parking towers.
Submitted to Daily News (8 November 2001): Published
One of the favourite scapegoats of HRM's growing traffic problem is Metro Transit. The criticisms range from too many buses on the streets (taking valuable road space away from automobiles) to too few buses serving outlying subdivisions. Some of the critics call for more spending, others less; still others demand that Metro Transit be governed by 'market forces' and pay its own way.
When compared with other Canadian urban transit systems, Metro Transit does a reasonable job. For example, according to the recently completed review of the Canada Transportation Act, urban transit carries about five percent of all urban passengers; in HRM, the figure is closer to 15 percent. The review also stated that nationally, fare-box revenues met about 50 percent of transit's operating costs; in Metro Transit's case, the number was 76 percent in 2000.
The review of the Canada Transportation Act makes two other interesting observations that are often overlooked by the critics of urban transit. The first is the benefits of transit: according to the review, urban transit subsidies costs Canadians about $2.2 billion annually. However, the benefits associated with transit (notably reduced congestion, fewer accidents, and less environmental damage), amounts to about $5 to $6 billion. If Metro Transit did not exist and the estimated 63,000 passengers it carries each weekday adopted the automobile as their primary mode of transport, an additional 10,000 to 15,000 vehicles would be on HRM's roads.
The second observation the review makes is that despite the billions of taxpayers' dollars spent on urban transit over the past decade, transit is making little headway at increasing the number of paying passengers. The reason for this seeming anomaly is due in large part to government policies that encourage the creation of low-density suburbs that are designed for the automobile, not transit services. Since transit cannot move people from the suburbs to their places of work, municipal and provincial governments respond by building more roads.
The problems associated with automobile traffic around the Armview-Jubilee area are, in part, a result of policies that have permitted the development of suburbs in Tantallon and Timberlea. Their low density and street design, like that found in most other suburbs, makes operating a transit service problematic. If the Armview-Jubilee traffic problems (and many others in HRM) are to be solved, it will take a radical change in the way suburbs are designed.
One solution that innovative developers in the United States and Europe are adopting is to create a suburb that has a higher density of houses clustered around a central focal point. The focal point supports shops, restaurants, small businesses, and civic amenities such as parks and community swimming pools. To reduce dependence on the automobile, the suburb is designed with sidewalks to encourage walking and cycling. People living in these suburbs (essentially a village or small town) develop a sense of community because they are closer to their neighbours. Perhaps more importantly, young children lead healthier lives because they needn't be chauffeured by automobile to visit their friends or 'go to the store'; they can walk or bicycle.
In addition to these benefits, the higher density of housing allows urban transit to operate in a more cost-effective manner, making the suburb 'transit friendly'. The suburb can be linked by urban transit to centers of employment or other activities.
The population of the Tantallon-Timberlea area is projected to increase by about 8,000 over the next decade. If the new suburbs required to house these people could be developed as higher-density, transit-friendly communities, everyone would benefit, from those living in the communities to those who live along the HRM's commuter roadways. The question is, will HRM council show the vision and leadership required for the creation of such communities?
Submitted to Daily News (28 November 2001): Published
If there is one thing that almost all Nova Scotians can agree upon, it is that much of the province's highway system is in a sorry state. Years of neglect, heavier vehicles, weather, and the increasing movement of goods by road have all contributed to the present state of the province's highway system.
Fixing the system won't be an easy matter. Last summer the provincial Department of Transportation and Public Works released a document stating that the province would have to spend $340 million per year for the next decade to make the necessary road and bridge improvements. Where the province intends to find $3.4 billion between now and 2010 is anyone's guess.
The most obvious source of funds for such a project is the provincial motive fuel tax of 13.5 cents per litre that drivers pay when buying gasoline and diesel fuel. In 2000-01, the province received $263 million from road users ($201 million from the motive fuel tax and $62 million from the Registry of Motor Vehicles).
Where did the $263 million go? The Department of Transportation and Public Works' highway operations business had a 2000-01 budget of about $124 million, which included the maintenance of existing highways and bridges, snow and ice control, salaries and benefits, and ferries. The remaining $139 million obtained from road users was treated as part of the overall provincial revenue and used for other expenditures such as health, education, and community services. (Even if Nova Scotians were willing to use the $139 million on the proposed road and bridge improvements programme, it would still be less than one-half of the amount required each year.)
Anyone who purchases gasoline or diesel fuel knows that the Federal government also takes a ten-cent excise tax on every litre sold. This amounts to about $150 million per year from Nova Scotia. The excise tax is used by the Federal government to finance various programmes, including equalization and transfer payments. If the Federal government could be convinced to use the excise tax on Nova Scotia's road and bridge improvements programme (a highly unlikely prospect), it would still fall short of the programme's projected annual costs.
In April 2001, Transport Canada Minister Collenette announced the $600 million Strategic Highway Improvement Programme. The Nova Scotia government was the first province to sign a three year joint-funding agreement with Transport Canada worth about $27 million to 'twin' 21 kilometres of Highway 101 between Mount Uniacke and Ellershouse. Whether this is money well spent is yet to be determined (other sections of Highway 101 are in greater need of improvement); however, it just highlights the fact that there is simply not enough money to fix the provincial highway system.
Given Nova Scotia's present financial situation and the public's demands for maintaining healthcare and education, it is clear that some other source of funds must be found to improve the state of the province's transportation infrastructure.
The 2001 review of the Canada Transportation Act addressed this issue; quite simply, users should pay the full cost of using the road network. This is a surprisingly complex issue, since it is first necessary to define what is meant by 'full cost'.
To most researchers, 'full cost' includes the direct cost of building and maintaining the road network, plus the 'externalities' or external costs that are paid by society at large rather than individual drivers. Externalities include social and environmental costs, such as policing, accidents, the loss of cropland, and the health impact of vehicular emissions.
As an example, consider the cost of road accidents. Transport Canada has estimated the costs of road accidents, taking into account factors such as medical and insurance expenses, productivity loss, road cleanup, emergency services, and human grieving and suffering. In 1999, Transport Canada estimated the societal cost of road accidents to be: property damage only ($2,000), minor injury ($10,000), major injury ($60,000), and fatality ($1.5 million). Using this method of calculation and the year 2000 accident statistics for Nova Scotia gives the cost of accidents to society to be about $484 million.
A partial full cost (based on maintenance and accident costs only, ignoring policing, environmental, and health costs) amounts to $824 million per year. This is about $900 for every resident of Nova Scotia or $1500 per vehicle.
If Nova Scotian's want to improve the province's highway system it will be necessary to make the user pay. This can be done in a variety of ways, including toll roads, higher motive fuel taxes, or higher license fees. The question is, are Nova Scotians willing to pay the price? If they aren't, the province will have to look at alternatives to existing ways of transporting goods and people.
Submitted to Daily News (10 December 2001): Published